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21.Technical_Dif_in_Dif_Premand_Holla_ENG_PP

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DIFFERENCES This material constitutes supporting material for the "Impact Evaluation in Practice" book. This additional material is made freely but please acknowledge its use as follows: Gertler, P. J.; Martinez, S.,

Слайды и текст этой презентации

Слайд 1


Слайд 2DIFFERENCES
This material constitutes supporting material for the "Impact Evaluation

in Practice" book. This additional material is made freely but

please acknowledge its use as follows: Gertler, P. J.; Martinez, S., Premand, P., Rawlings, L. B. and Christel M. J. Vermeersch, 2010, Impact Evaluation in Practice: Ancillary Material, The World Bank, Washington DC (www.worldbank.org/ieinpractice). The content of this presentation reflects the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the World Bank.


Technical Track Session III

IN

& PANEL DATA

DIFFERENCE

DIFFERENCES This material constitutes supporting material for the

Слайд 3Structure of this session
When do we use Differences-in-Differences? (Diff-in-Diff or

DD)
Estimation strategy: 3 ways to look at DD
Examples:
Extension of education

services (Indonesia)
Water for life (Argentina)

1

2

3

Structure of this sessionWhen do we use Differences-in-Differences? (Diff-in-Diff or DD)Estimation strategy: 3 ways to look at

Слайд 4When do we use DD?
1
We can’t always randomize
E.g. Estimating the

impact of a “past” program
As always, we need to identify
which

is the group affected by the policy change (“treatment”), and
which is the group that is not affected (“comparison”)

We can try to find a “natural experiment” that allows us to identify the impact of a policy

E.g. An unexpected change in policy
E.g. A policy that only affects 16 year-olds but not 15 year-olds
In general, exploit variation of policies in time and space

The quality of the comparison group determines the quality of the evaluation.

When do we use DD?1We can’t always randomizeE.g. Estimating the impact of a “past” programAs always, we

Слайд 53 ways to looks at DD
2
In a Box
Graphically
In a Regression

3 ways to looks at DD2In a BoxGraphicallyIn a Regression

Слайд 6The box
DD=[(Y̅1|D=1)-(Y̅0|D=1)] - [(Y̅1|D=0)-(Y̅0|D=0)]

The boxDD=[(Y̅1|D=1)-(Y̅0|D=1)] - [(Y̅1|D=0)-(Y̅0|D=0)]

Слайд 7Graphically
Outcome Variable
Y0 | Di=1
Y1 | Di=0
Y0 | Di=0


T=0
T=1
Time
Enrolled
Not enrolled
Estimated ATE
Y1 | Di=1
DD=[(Y̅1|D=1)-(Y̅0|D=1)] - [(Y̅1|D=0)-(Y̅0|D=0)]

GraphicallyOutcome VariableY0 | Di=1 Y1 | Di=0 Y0 | Di=0 T=0 T=1 TimeEnrolledNot enrolledEstimated ATEY1 | Di=1DD=[(Y̅1|D=1)-(Y̅0|D=1)]

Слайд 8Regression (for 2 time periods)

Regression (for 2 time periods)

Слайд 9Regression (for 2 time periods)

Regression (for 2 time periods)

Слайд 10If we have more than 2 time periods/groups:
We use a

regression with fixed effects for time and group…

If we have more than  2 time periods/groups:We use a regression with fixed effects for time

Слайд 11Identification in DD
The identification of the treatment effect is based

on the inter-temporal variation between the groups.
I.e. Changes in the

outcome variable Y over time, that are specific to the treatment groups.

I.e. Jumps in trends in the outcome variable, that happen only for the treatment groups, not for the comparison groups, exactly at the time that the treatment kicks in.

Identification in DDThe identification of the treatment effect is based on the inter-temporal variation between the groups.I.e.

Слайд 12Warnings
DD/ fixed effects control for:
Fixed group effects. E.g. Farmers who

own their land, farmers who don’t own their land
Effects that

are common to all groups at one particular point in time, or “common trends”. E.g. The 2006 drought affected all farmers, regardless of who owns the land

Valid only when the policy change has an immediate impact on the outcome variable.

If there is a delay in the impact of the policy change, we do need to use lagged treatment variables.

WarningsDD/ fixed effects control for:Fixed group effects. E.g. Farmers who own their land, farmers who don’t own

Слайд 13Warnings
DD attributes any differences in trends between the treatment and

control groups, that occur at the same time as the

intervention, to that intervention.

If there are other factors that affect the difference in trends between the two groups, then the estimation will be biased!

WarningsDD attributes any differences in trends between the treatment and control groups, that occur at the same

Слайд 14Violation of Equal Trend Assumption
Outcome Variable
T=0
T=1
Time
Enrolled
Not enrolled
Y0 |

Di=1
Y1 | Di=0
Y0 | Di=0
Estimated Impact
Y1 |

Di=1

Bias

Violation of Equal Trend AssumptionOutcome VariableT=0 T=1 TimeEnrolledNot enrolledY0 | Di=1 Y1 | Di=0 Y0 | Di=0

Слайд 15Sensitivity analysis for diff-in-diff
Perform a “placebo” DD, i.e. use a

“fake” treatment group
Ex. for previous years (e.g. Years -2, -1).
Or

using as a treatment group a population you know was NOT affected
If the DD estimate is different from 0, the trends are not parallel, and our original DD is likely to be biased.

Use a different comparison group
The two DDs should give the same estimates.

Use an outcome variable Y2 which you know is NOT affected by the intervention:

Using the same comparison group and treatment year
If the DD estimate is different from zero, we have a problem

Sensitivity analysis for diff-in-diffPerform a “placebo” DD, i.e. use a “fake” treatment groupEx. for previous years (e.g.

Слайд 16Frequently occurring issues in DD
Participation is based in difference in

outcomes prior to the intervention. E.g. “Ashenfelter dip”: selection into

treatment influence by transitory shocks on past outcomes (Ashenfelter, 1978; Chay et al., 2005 ).

If program impact is heterogeneous across individual characteristics, pre-treatment differences in observed characteristics can create non-parallel outcome dynamics (Abadie, 2005).

Similarly, bias would occur when the size of the response depends in a non-linear way on the size of the intervention, and we compare a group with high treatment intensity, with a group with low treatment intensity

When outcomes within the unit of time/group are correlated, OLS standard errors understate the st. dev. of the DD estimator (Bertrand et al., 2004).

Frequently occurring issues in DDParticipation is based in difference in outcomes prior to the intervention. E.g. “Ashenfelter

Слайд 17Example 1 Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction

in Indonesia: evidence from an unusual policy experiment
Esther Duflo, MIT American

Economic Review, Sept 2001
Example 1  Schooling and labor market consequences of school construction  in Indonesia: evidence from an

Слайд 18Research questions
School infrastructure
Educational achievement
Educational achievement?
Salary level?
What is the economic return

on schooling?

Research questionsSchool infrastructureEducational achievementEducational achievement?Salary level?What is the economic return on schooling?

Слайд 19Program description
1973-1978: The Indonesian government built 61,000 schools equivalent to

one school per 500 children between 5 and 14 years

old

The enrollment rate increased from 69% to 85% between 1973 and 1978

The number of schools built in each region depended on the number of children out of school in those regions in 1972, before the start of the program.

Program description1973-1978: The Indonesian government built 61,000 schools equivalent to one school per 500 children between 5

Слайд 20Identification of the treatment effect
By region
There is variation in the

number of schools received in each region.
There are 2 sources

of variations in the intensity of the program for a given individual:

By age

Children who were older than 12 years in 1972 did not benefit from the program.
The younger a child was 1972, the more it benefited from the program –because she spent more time in the new schools.

Identification of the treatment effectBy regionThere is variation in the number of schools received in each region.There

Слайд 21Sources of data
1995 population census.
Individual-level data on:
birth

date
1995 salary level
1995 level of education
The intensity of the building

program in the birth region of each person in the sample.

Sample: men born between 1950 and 1972.

Sources of data 1995 population census. Individual-level data on: birth date1995 salary level1995 level of educationThe intensity

Слайд 22A first estimation of the impact
Step 1: Let’s simplify the

problem and estimate the impact of the program.
We simplify

the intensity of the program: high or low

Young cohort of children who benefitted
Older cohort of children who did not benefit

We simplify the groups of children affected by the program

A first estimation of the impactStep 1: Let’s simplify the problem and estimate the impact of the

Слайд 23Let’s look at the average of the outcome variable “years

of schooling”

Let’s look at the average of the  outcome variable “years of schooling”

Слайд 24Let’s look at the average of the outcome variable “years

of schooling”

Let’s look at the average of the  outcome variable “years of schooling”

Слайд 25Placebo DD (Cf. p.798, Table 3, panel B)
Idea:
Look for 2

groups whom you know did not benefit, compute a DD,

and check whether the estimated effect is 0.
If it is NOT 0, we’re in trouble…
Placebo DD (Cf. p.798, Table 3, panel B)Idea: Look for 2 groups whom you know did not

Слайд 26Step 2: Let’s estimate this with a regression

Step 2: Let’s estimate this with a regression

Слайд 27Step 3: Let’s use additional information

Step 3: Let’s use additional information

Слайд 28Program effect per cohort
Age in 1974

Program effect per cohort Age in 1974

Слайд 29For y = Dependent variable = Salary

For y = Dependent variable = Salary

Слайд 30Conclusion
Results: For each school built per 1000 students;
The average educational

achievement increase by 0.12- 0.19 years
The average salaries increased

by 2.6 – 5.4 %

Making sure the DD estimation is accurate:

A placebo DD gave 0 estimated effect
Use various alternative specifications
Check that the impact estimates for each age cohort make sense.

ConclusionResults: For each school built per 1000 students;The average educational achievement increase by 0.12- 0.19 years The

Слайд 31Example 2 Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization

of Water Services on Child Mortality
Sebastián Galiani, Universidad de San

Andrés Paul Gertler, UC Berkeley Ernesto Schargrodsky, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
JPE (2005)
Example 2  Water for Life:  The Impact of the Privatization of  Water Services on

Слайд 32Changes in water services delivery 1990-1999

Changes in water services delivery  1990-1999

Слайд 34Use “outside” factors to determine who privatizes
The political party that

governed the municipality
Federal, Peronist y Provincial parties: allowed privatization
Radical party:

did not allow privatization

Which party was in power/whether the water got privatized did not depend on:

Income, unemployment, inequality at the municipal level
Recent changes in infant mortality rates

Use “outside” factors to determine who privatizesThe political party that governed the municipalityFederal, Peronist y Provincial parties:

Слайд 35Regression

Regression

Слайд 37DD results: Privatization reduced infant mortality

DD results: Privatization reduced infant mortality

Слайд 38Sensitivity analysis
1
2
Check that the trends in infant mortality were identical

in the two types of municipalities before privatization
You can do

this by running the same equation, using only the years before the intervention – the treatment effect should be zero for those years
Found that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal trends between treatment and controls, in the years before privatization

Check that privatization only affects mortality through reasons that are logically related to water and sanitation issues.

For example, there is no effect of privatization on death rate from cardiovascular disease or accidents.

Sensitivity analysis12Check that the trends in infant mortality were identical in the two types of municipalities before

Слайд 39Impact of privatization on death from various causes DD on common

support

Impact of privatization on death from various causes DD on common support

Слайд 40Privatization has a larger effect in poor and very poor

municipalities than in non-poor municipalities

Privatization has a larger effect in poor and very poor municipalities than in non-poor municipalities

Слайд 41Conclusion
Privatization of water services is associated with a reduction in

infant mortality of 5-7%.
Using a combination of methods, we found

that:

The reduction of mortality is:

Due to fewer deaths from infectious and parasitic diseases.
Not due to changes in death rates from reasons not related to water and sanitation

The largest decrease in infant mortality occurred in low income municipalities.

ConclusionPrivatization of water services is associated with a reduction in infant mortality of 5-7%.Using a combination of

Слайд 42References
Abadie, A. (2005). “Semiparametric Difference-in-Differences Estimators”, Review of Economic Studies,

72.
Ashenfelter, O. (1978): “Estimating the Effect of Training Programs on

Earnings,” The Review of Economic and Statistics, 60, 1. pp. 47-57.

Chay, Ken, McEwan, Patrick and Miguel Urquiola (2005): “The central role of noise in evaluating interventions that use test scores to rank schools,” American Economic Review, 95, pp. 1237-58.

Gertler, Paul (2004): “Do Conditional Cash Transfers Improve Child Health? Evidence from PROGRESA’s Control Randomized Experiment,” American Economic Review, 94, pp. 336-41.

Duflo, E. (2001). “Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence From an Unusual Policy Experiment,” American Economic Review, Sept 2001

Galiani, S., Gertler, P. and E. Schargrodsky (2005): “Water for Life: The Impact of the Privatization of Water Services on Child Mortality,” Journal of Political Economy, Volume 113, pp. 83-120.

Bertrand, M., Duflo, E. and S. Mullainathan (2004). “How much should we trust differences-in-differences Estimates?,” Quarterly Journal of Economics.

ReferencesAbadie, A. (2005). “Semiparametric Difference-in-Differences Estimators”, Review of Economic Studies, 72.Ashenfelter, O. (1978): “Estimating the Effect of

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